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Pennsylvania's Legislative Response to
Blue v. Blue: Adult Children May See

Green, But Do Both Parents and Children
Have Reasons to Remain Blue?
I. Introduction
A parent's obligation, following the dissolution of marriage, to
provide support for a child's post-secondary education has engendered
debate among courts, legislatures, parents, and young adults in many
states.'
Until recently, this issue appeared closed to debate in
Pennsylvania. 2 In fact, case law dating back to 1963 recognized a
divorced or separated parent's duty to pay such support.3
However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Blue v.
Blue4 reopened debate over this issue in the Commonwealth. The Blue

court held that, absent statutory authority, Pennsylvania courts could not
impose a duty on divorced or separated parents to fund their children's
post-secondary education.' The decision not only evoked harsh criticism
from young adults who relied upon court-ordered support from parents,
but also triggered a rush of petitions from non-custodial parents seeking
to terminate such support. 6
In response to the Blue court's holding and to public reaction to the
decision, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted title 23, section
4327 of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.'
Title 23 authorizes
Pennsylvania courts to order parents who are divorced, separated,

1. See Scott Maier, ParentsNeeding Deeper Pocketsfor Child Support: DeterminingLegal
Obligationsfor College Tuition a Hot Issue in Divorce, CHi. TRIB., May 20, 1993, at C3; Barbara
Rabinovitz, Divorce Bar Split over Upping Age of Support, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 5,1991, at
1; Bala James Baptiste, Child Support Cutoffs Mar College Path, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 23,
1991, at B2.
2. See text discussion infra parts HI, V.
3. See Commw. ex rel. Ulmer v. Sommerville, 190 A.2d 182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).
4. 616 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1992).
5. Id. at 632.
6. See Murray Dubin, The Tuition Tangle: DivorcedFathersRushed to File Papersafterthe
State Supreme CourtRuled They Didn'tHaveto FootTheir Children'sCollege Bills; Ex-spouses Are
Alarmed; And a Delaware County LegislatorPromises Action, PHILA. INQ., Jan. 13, 1993, at Fl.
The article noted that, since the Blue decision, twenty-five petitions had been filed with the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas by non-custodial parents seeking relief from support
obligations for their children's college expenses. Id. At that time, the bench and bar believed that
these petitions represented only a small fraction of the number that would ultimately be filed by noncustodial parents across the Commonwealth. Id.
7. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327 (Supp. 1994).
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unmarried,' or otherwise subject to an existing support obligation to
provide equitably for the post-secondary educational expenses of their
children. 9 Part II of this Comment traces the historical development in
the United States of a parent's duty of support for post-secondary
educational costs.'" Part III examines Pennsylvania's treatment of the
issue prior to the decision in Blue. Part IV summarizes the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's holding in Blue, and Part V reviews the
provisions of the recently enacted statute. Finally, Part VI provides a
critique of the legislation and assesses its effectiveness in balancing
competing policy objectives.
II. The Historical Development of a Parent's Duty to Provide Support
for Post-secondary Educational Expenses
Court-ordered support and maintenance generally applies only to
minor children." Ordinarily, a parent's legal obligation to support a
child terminates upon the child's reaching the statutory age of
majority. 12 Prior to 1971, age twenty-one represented the statutory age
of majority in most states.' 3 At that time, a divorced or separated

8. Inclusion of unmarried parents as a class potentially subject to support orders for postsecondary educational expenses distinguishes the Pennsylvania statute from those in states where a
similar statutory duty exists. See infra note 42. However, in at least one jurisdiction, unmarried
parents are subject to support orders for such expenses, despite the absence of a statutory command.
See, e.g., Ex-parte Jones, 592 So.2d 608, 610 (Ala. 1991) (holding that Alabama's college education
exception to the general rule that a parent has no duty to support a child beyond the age of majority
applies where the parents were not married at the time of birth of the child and were not married
thereafter).
9. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327.
10. For purposes of this Comment, a parent's duty of support for post-secondary educational
expenses is framed within the context of a divorced or separated parent's obligation to provide such
support. This provides the necessary foundation for examination and analysis of Pennsylvania's
recently enacted statute. However, at least one commentator has argued that the history of this area
of the law suggests the evolution of a cause of action for a child whose parents are married but who
have unjustly denied college support. See David L. Sage II, Post-secondaryEducation: Why Can't
Johnny Read Even Though His ParentsAre Happily Married?,29 J. FAm. L. 923 (1991).
1I.
67A C.J.S. Parent& Child § 49 (1978). Historically, support for minor children has been
governed almost exclusively by state law. However, the federal government's role has expanded
in the past twenty years with the creation of a federal-state child support enforcement program.
Moreover, the federal government in 1984 mandated that each state establish discretionary guidelines
for child support awards. See Rhonda McMillion, Congress Seeks StrongerInterstate Child Support
System, 79 A.B.A. J. 107 (Aug. 1993). For an historical overview of Pennsylvania child support
laws and a discussion of the Commonwealth's statutory support guidelines, see Ball v. Minnick, 606
A.2d 1181, 1191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that application of the state's support guidelines is
subject to judicial discretion).
12. 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 62a (1978).
13. Kathleen Conrey Horan, Post-Minority Support for College Education- A Legally
Enforceable Obligation in Divorce Proceedings?, 18 N.M. L. REv. 153 (1988).

BLUE v. BLUE

parent had little incentive to challenge a support obligation for postsecondary educational expenses because most children completed their
educations before, or shortly after, attaining the age of majority. 4
However, adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amendment 5 in 1971
created a new avenue through which non-custodial parents could
challenge the notion that a duty of support included payments for postsecondary education. 16 In response to the Constitutional amendment
lowering the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen, many state
legislatures reduced the age of majority to eighteen for voting as well as
other purposes. 7 Because most children pursuing post-secondary
education were no longer minors in these states, non-custodial parents
argued that a divorce court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over the
matter ceased, and thus, the court could neither order nor enforce
support for post-secondary educational expenses. 8
The logic of this argument did not escape the notice of several state
legislatures. These legislatures responded by enacting new or amending
existing statutes to protect the interests of dependent adult children
pursuing post-secondary education. 9 Iowa, for instance, amended its
definition of support in 1972 to include support for children between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-two who regularly attended high school,
obtained vocational training, or attended an approved college, university,
or area school on a full-time basis.2'
On the other hand, Washington enacted an entirely new statute.21
The Washington Dissolution of Marriage Act empowered a court in a
divorce proceeding to "order either or both parents owing a duty of
support to any child of the marriage dependent upon either or both
spouses to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for support."' The
statute did not specify whether a college-age child remained dependent,
despite attaining the age of majority, or whether post-secondary
educational expenses constituted reasonable and necessary amounts for
support. However, subsequent case law in the state of Washington
definitively answered these questions.'

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 155.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
Horan, supra note 13, at 154.
Horan, supra ntoe 13, at 153.
Horan, supra note 13, at 155.
Horan, supra note 13, at 162-63.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.010 (West 1986).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09. 100 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992-1993).
See Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 206-07 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (holding that a
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Most notably, the Supreme Court of Washington in Childers v.
Childers' construed the state legislature's change in wording from
"minor" to "dependent" in the support provision of the Dissolution of
Marriage Act as indicative of its intent to base the determination of a

child support order upon the notion of dependency rather than the
statutory age of majority.'2 Thus, the duty of a parent to assist a child
in paying for post-secondary educational expenses could be imposed
following an examination of the particular facts and circumstances.26
The Childers court specifically noted that a child's age is but one factor
that should be examined when assessing dependency, in addressing the

merits of a petition for support for post-secondary educational
expenses .27
Courts in other jurisdictions have followed the lead of the
Washington Supreme Court and have interpreted their respective states'

statutes as encompassing court-ordered support for the post-secondary
educational expenses of children who have attained the age of
majority.28 Both social and economic forces, including a marked rise
in the divorce rate,29 an increase in the number of young adults
pursuing post-secondary education," and a steady rise in education
costs31 have all contributed to this particular development in the law.

parent's duty to support a child may include providing funds for a college education); In re Marriage
of Campbell, 589 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a trial court did not abuse
its discretion in defining children beyond the age of majority as dependents while pursuing a college
education).
24. 575 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978).
25. Id. at 204.
26. Id. at 206.
27. Id. at 205.
28. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
29. ARTHUR J. NORTON & LOUISA F. MILLER, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., PUB. No, P23-180,
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE INTHE 1990's (1992). Mr. Norton and Ms. Miller present
statistics demonstrating that, between the late 1960's and 1980, the divorce rate doubled to fifty
percent in the United States. Id. The report further reveals that the divorce rate stabilized during
the 1980's and even evidenced a small drop toward the end of the decade. Id. However, the report
confirmed estimates made by others that nearly half of all children today will spend time in a singleparent family. Id. at 1.
30. As one professor recently told his audience during a commencement exercise, "[t]he college
experience has gone from a rite of passage to a right of passage." Mel Elfin, Does College Still
Pay?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 4, 1993, at 96. In the article, Elfin discloses statistics
supporting the professor's assertion. Id. In 1950, forty-three percent of all high school graduates
pursued some form of post-secondary education. Id. In 1992, nearly sixty-six percent opted for
higher education. Id. The number of citizens holding undergraduate degrees also increased from
six percent to twenty-one percent during the same period. Id.
31. Between 1980 and 1989 alone, the total revenue publicly and privately-controlled
universities, colleges, professional schools, and junior colleges derived from tuition and fees jumped
from fourteen billion to nearly thirty-four billion dollars. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL
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For example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Gnirk v. Gnirk"2
upheld a trial court's decision to modify a support order to include
contributions for a child's post-secondary education, even though the
original order in the divorce proceeding did not contain a provision for
such expenses.33 The Gnirk decision was compelled by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court's holding in French v. French.' In French,
the court employed reasoning similar to that of the Washington Supreme
Court in Childers and held that the absence of the word "minor" in the
state's statute35 supported the contention that a New Hampshire court
possesses the authority to enter a support order for college expenses.'
South Carolina's statutory provision contains the same broad
language found in the Washington and New Hampshire statutes.37
Generally, a South Carolina court has the discretion to construct orders
concerning the care, custody, and maintenance of the children of a
marriage when the court deems it to be fit, equitable, and just.3 The
language of the statute does not specifically authorize a court to order a
divorced parent to pay for the educational expenses of a child who has
reached the age of majority. However, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that the statute nonetheless authorizes parental contribution
for such expenses when exceptional circumstances exist. 9 In order to
find exceptional circumstances a court must consider certain factors
articulated in prior case law.'
Washington, South Carolina and New Hampshire's interpretation of
their existing statutes as encompassing parental support for post-

ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, T. 262, at 165 (112th ed. 1992).

At the micro-level, this
translates, on average, into a sixty-three hundred dollar increase in tuition and room and board for
each student. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, T. 269, at
169 (112th ed. 1992).
32. 589 A.2d 1008 (N.H. 1991).
33. Id.; see also LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H. 1993).
34. 378 A.2d 1127 (N.H. 1977).
35. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(I) (1992). Section 458:17(1) states, "[iln all cases where
there shall be a decree of divorce or nullity, the court shall make such further decree in relation to
the support, education, and custody of the children as shall be most conducive to their benefit and
may order a reasonable provision for their support and education." Id.
36. French, 378 A.2d at 1129.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
38. Id.
39. Bull v. Smith, 382 S.E.2d 905 (S.C. 1989).
40. The six factors articulated in South Carolina case law are as follows: (1) Do the
characteristics of the child indicate that he or she will benefit from college?; (2) Has the child
demonstrated an ability to do well, or at least make satisfactory grades?; (3) Can the child otherwise
not go to school?; (4) Does the parent have the ability to finance the education?; (5) Are grants and
loans available?; (6) May the child earn income during the school year or vacation? See Nicholson
v. Lewis, 369 S.E.2d 649, 650 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988).
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secondary educational expenses beyond the age of majority represents the
minority view." Most states adhere to the strict rule that a parent's
obligation to support a child ends either upon that child's reaching the
age of majority or upon completion of high school, whichever occurs
later. 2 Several states depart slightly from this rule and recognize
support orders for post-secondary educational costs where specific
provisions were included in a contract or in a settlement agreement
approved by the court.43
Nonetheless, a few states have enacted legislation which specifically
authorizes courts to enter support orders for post-secondary educational
expenses under certain circumstances."
Although several of these
statutes have been enacted within the past decade, this legislative activity
does not necessarily demonstrate an emerging trend within this area of
family law. One state legislature, for example, has recently amended its
statute to limit parental support payments to those necessary to complete
high school."5 Another state legislature has attempted to impose

41. In fact, in Wyoming, where the child support statute, like those in Washington, South
Carolina, and New Hampshire, refers to children as opposed to minors, no party has argued that the
statute should be construed as encompassing support for post-secondary educational expenses.
Instead, the only challenge raised has been that the statute should be construed as granting a court
authority to increase support payments for disabled children who have attained the age of majority.
See Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1982).
42. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.310 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501 (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 743.07(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-207 (Harrison 1980 &
Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 32-706(B) (Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.020 (Baldwin
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:309 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.222(lc)
(Callaghan 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.57 (West 1990 &Supp. 1992-1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-364 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125:230 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-11(A) (Michie
1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c)(2) (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(E) (Baldwin
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112(D) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994); R.I. GEN. LAws §
15-5-16.2(b) (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-5-18.1 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-11102(b) (1991 & Supp. 1993); TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 19921993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 658(c) (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.25 (West 1993).
43. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(5) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(4) (Supp.
1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 601610(a)(A) (Supp. 1992).
44. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(1.5)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (effective Sept. 1,
1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (Smith-Hurd
1980 & Supp. 1992-1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-12 (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West 1987
& Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34:23 (West Supp. 1993-1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108
(1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327 (Supp. 1994).
45. In Alaska, the support statute was recently amended to allow an award of post-majority
support only where an unmarried eighteen year-old child actively pursues a high school diploma or
the equivalent level of technical or vocational training and lives with a parent or guardian or a
designee of a parent or guardian. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.310 (a) (1992). Furthermore, a newly
created section authorizes that a court order may indicate that such support be paid directly to a child

BLUE V. BLUE

limitations upon a divorced parent's obligation, under current state law,
to support a child who has chosen to pursue post-secondary education.46
III. The Genesis in Pennsylvania of a Divorced Parent's Duty to
Support a Child's Pursuit of Post-secondary Education
Prior to the decision in Blue, Pennsylvania courts consistently held
that a divorced or separated parent could be obligated to pay for all or
part of an adult child's 47 post-secondary educational expenses under

certain circumstances."

Although one statutory provision in existence

prior to enactment of title 23, section 4327 may have furnished the basis
for such an obligation, Pennsylvania courts apparently avoided reference
to it when considering support petitions for post-secondary educational
costs. 49 Instead, Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Sommerville'0
controlled Pennsylvania's stance on the issue of post-majority support for
nearly thirty years.
In Sommerville, a father, who had been paying support pursuant to
an agreement, petitioned the court to vacate the support order as to one

satisfying the above-mentioned criteria. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.910 (1992). Both the amendment
and the addition to Alaska statutory law affirm the prevailing view among states that child support
ends at age eighteen, unless the child is still completing high school or an equivalent level of
education.
46. In Indiana, the Indiana Child Support Advisory Committee to the Indiana Supreme Court
recommended in 1992 that child support payments by a non-custodial parent should be reduced by
seventy-five percent if that parent is also required to help pay for the child's college education. See
Panel: Cut Child Support if College Costs Involved, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 26, 1992, at 3. This
recommendation essentially mirrored legislation pending in the Indiana General Assembly which
would have reduced the support obligation by fifty percent. However, the legislation died when
members of the state general assembly attempted to increase the percentage to the amount stated in
the Committee recommendation. Id.
47. Since a child is viewed as an adult upon reaching the statutory age of majority, some courts
have wrestled with the issue of emancipation when considering petitions for post-secondary
educational support. Emancipation is the legal process by which a child is released from the control
and authority of a parent. 1 HOMER HARRSION CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES, § 9.3, at 548 (2d ed. 1987). Courts in Pennsylvania have held that
emancipation is a question of fact to be determined by the facts and circumstances of a case. See,
e.g., Mauer v. Mauer, 555 A.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); see also, Griffin v. Griffin,
558 A.2d 75, 81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that a daughter who gave birth to a child is not
emancipated for that reason alone). Furthermore, courts in the Commonwealth have held that
emancipation is a threshold inquiry that must be addressed before a court considers a support petition
for post-secondary educational expenses. See, e.g., Marino by Marino v. Marino, 601 A.2d 1240,
1250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
48. Initially, these circumstances focused upon the child's ability and interest in pursuing postsecondary education and the parent's ability to pay. See infra notes 50-63.
49. The statute reads in part, "Parents may be liable for the support of their children who are
eighteen years or older." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4321(3) (1991).
50. 190 A.2d 182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).
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daughter attending college.51 The father argued that he was under no
obligation to continue support because the existing agreement made no
reference to the post-secondary education of his two daughters.52 The
trial court rejected this argument and enforced the support order for Mr.
Sommerville's elder daughter who had enrolled in college.53
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court's
ruling and held that the absence of an agreement in a divorce proceeding
concerning the post-secondary educational costs of the children may
warrant the vacation of a support order when a child reaches the
statutory age of majority. 4 However, the court also held that a trial
court must nonetheless examine the evidence to determine whether the
father should be required to continue support while a child attends
college.55 The court relied upon Commonwealth v. Gilmore,56 a 1929
Pennsylvania case in which the court ordered a father to continue to
provide support for a sixteen year-old son who wanted to complete his
.high school education.57 The Superior Court in Gilmore noted that the
"[liaw has come to recognize that parental duty involves such education
and instruction as may be necessary to fit the child reasonably to support
itself and be an element of strength rather than one of weakness in the
social fabric of the state. 58
The Sommerville court delineated a two prong test to be applied to
each case to determine the propriety of ordering or enforcing a support
order.5 9 The first prong looked at whether a child was able or willing
to successfully pursue a chosen course of study.' The second inquiry
focused upon the financial impact a support order would have on a
parent. Specifically, this prong focused on whether a parent had
sufficient assets, earning capacity, or income to pay without imposition
of undue hardship.61
In developing this two pronged test, the
Sommerville court recognized the non-exacting requirements of a support
order for post-secondary educational costs. 2 Nevertheless, the court

51. Id. at 183.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Sommerville, 190 A.2d at 185.
56. 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 303 (1929).
57. Id. at 312-13.
58. Id. at 308.
59. Sommerville, 190 A.2d at 184.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.

BLUE V. BLUE

did opine that some element of sacrifice may be necessary on the part of
a parent.'
Pennsylvania courts utilized the two-pronged test of Sommerville for
approximately twenty-five years without modification.
In 1989,
however, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania introduced a third level of
analysis with its decision in Milne v. Milne.' The Milne court held that
a son's total abandonment of his mother relieved her of a duty to
contribute to his college expenses.' In reaching this outcome, the court
expressed its dissatisfaction with the limitations inherent in the
Sommerville test and reasoned that where a court stands in the place of
a parent and exercises its equitable powers, it cannot ignore the familial
aspects central to the policy concerns giving rise to intervention by the
court in the first place.' Consistent with this reasoning, the court held
that an adult child's willful estrangement from a parent must be a factor
added to the two-tier analysis of Sommerville.'
IV. Blue v. Blue
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Blue expressly rejected the
Sommerville-Milne analysis.'
In support of its decision, the court
reasoned that the underlying premise upon which Pennsylvania courts

63. Id. See infra note 108 and accompanying text for an illustration of the degree of sacrifice
expected of one parent prior to enactment of title 23, section 4327.
64. 556 A.2d 854 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
65. The facts of Milne are poignant and noteworthy. Caleb Milne, the son, had lived with his
mother following the separation of his parents in 1984. Milne, 556 A.2d at 855. Caleb was a senior
in high school at the time of separation. Id. By March of 1985, Caleb became estranged from his
mother and moved into his father's residence. Id. The evidence adduced at trial revealed that Caleb
physically attacked his mother prior to moving out. Id. Apparently, Caleb struck her, spat in her
face, and shoved her to the ground on at least two occasions. Id. at 855-56. Under these
circumstances, the court vacated the lower court's entry of an order of support against Caleb's
mother, refusing to "glorify the institution of higher learning at the expense of the institution of the
family." Id. at 860.
66. Milne, 556 A.2d at 859.
67. Id. at 861.
68. Blue v. Blue, 616 A.2d 628, 631 (Pa. 1992). In Blue, the son, Reginald brought suit
against his father. The trial court awarded Reginald forty-six hundred dollars per year in support.
Id. at 630. However, the award would be reduced by any financial aid he received. Id. The
superior court affirmed the support award but reversed the trial court by awarding the full amount
of support regardless of any financial aid that Reginald received. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the conflict in outcomes reached by
the lower courts was irrelevant, since neither statutory nor specific case law in the Commonwealth
enunciated the principle that a divorced or separated parent had a legal obligation to pay college
expenses. Id. at 631. The court conceded that its decision in Emerick v. Emerick, 284 A.2d 682
(Pa. 1971), addressed a parent's obligation to pay such costs but only in the narrow context where
both parents had entered into an agreement covering post-secondary education expenses and had
subsequently incorporated the agreement into the divorce decree. Blue, 616 A.2d at 631.
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applied the Sommerville-Milne tests never existed in either the common
or statutory law.' Furthermore, the court rejected the Superior Court's
application of the Gilmore analysis to support for post-secondary
education.7" It contended that the holding of Gilmore supported a
child's entitlement to necessary, as opposed to enhanced, education. 7'
While the court resoundingly held that a parent's common law duty
to support a child ends at age eighteen, it predicted a legislative response
to the holding.7 2 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania perceived that the
more prudent course was to await guidance from the general assembly,
a body which had "taken an active role in domestic matters through
amendments and reenactment of the Divorce Code and the Domestic
Relations Act. " " Within seven and one-half months, the general
assembly accomplished that which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
predicted. The governing body enacted title 23, section 4327, which
imposes a duty upon divorced, separated, or unmarried parents to
provide equitably for the post-secondary educational expenses of their
children.74
The legislation, signed on July 2, 1993, applied
retroactively to November 12, 1992, the day before the Blue decision.7"
V. Examination and Analysis of the Provisions of Pennsylvania's
Post-secondary Educational Support Statute
An examination of the provisions comprising title 23, section 4327,
coupled with cross-references to case law from the preceding thirty
years, provides a more thorough understanding of the scope of the statute
and exposes vaguely defined areas which may produce future litigation.
A. Subsection 4327(a)
Subsection (a) of the statute grants a court the authority to order
either or both parents to provide equitably for the educational costs of

69. Blue 616 A.2d at 631. In reversing thirty years of precedent, the court succinctly stated,
"Upon closer scrutiny, what has been accepted as fact is actually fiction." Id.
70. Id. at 632.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327 (Supp. 1994).
75. NEIL HUROWITZ, PENNSYLVANIA SUPPORT PRACTICE, § 14.2.3(b) (Supp. 1993).
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their child.76 An application for support may be made before or after
the child reaches eighteen years of age.77
Subsection (a) also states that a court may order post-secondary
educational support for undergraduate or vocational education.7" An
examination of case law reveals that several cases entertained in the
previous decade may form the basis of this provision. In Commonwealth
ex rel. Stump v. Church,1 9 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed
a lower court decision and remanded the case with an order to enter an
appropriate support order for a father whose son was academically
ineligible to attend college but who had been enrolled in a private
preparatory school.'
In Knopp v. Turley,8 the Superior Court
affirmed a trial court's order of support for a child enrolled in
commercial art school, noting that Pennsylvania case law does not stand
for the proposition that a parent's obligation to provide for educational
expenses turns upon the type of school the child attends.' The 1989
Superior Court decision of Mauer v. Mauer' affirmed the holding of
Turley by remanding the case to determine the extent of a father's
support obligations to a son enrolled in automotive repair school.'
While subsection (a) clearly encompasses attendance at commercial art
school and receipt of vocational training, whether a court can order
support for preparatory school remains unclear.'
Finally, subsection (a) states that an award for post-secondary
educational costs may be entered only after the child or student
undergoes reasonable efforts to apply for scholarships, grants, and work-

76. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(a). Because subsection (a) authorizes a court to enter
a support order against either or both parents, the question of enforceability may arise where a child
brings suit against only one parent and the court orders support be paid by both parents. For the
order against the non-party parent to be valid, one must assume that title 23, section 4327
contemplates compulsory joinder of parents as defendants in an action commenced by the child.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 481 A.2d 1358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
80. Id. at 1361.
81. 518 A.2d 588 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
82. Id. at 590.
83. 555 A.2d 1294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
84. Id. at 1299.
85. Moreover, because the statute refers to periods of undergraduate or vocational education,
it is conceivable that a parent may be subject to providing support for a child who drops out of
school but later decides to resume post-secondary education. Undoubtedly, this may lead to
uncertainty for the parent regarding the extent and duration of a support obligation. However,
subsequent provisions, discussed infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text, temper such uncertainty
by limiting enforcement of support orders to age twenty-three and by permitting modification or
termination of a support order upon proof of a change in the educational status of the child.
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study assistance.86 The question necessarily arises: What constitutes
reasonable effort?
The Superior Court's analysis in Bedford v.
Bedford' may provide guidance for future application and interpretation
of this provision. In Bedford, an adult child missed the application
deadline at Pennsylvania State University, rendering him ineligible for
financial assistance that he would have been otherwise qualified to
receive. 8
The court nonetheless found the child's efforts to be
reasonable and in good faith, because his late application to the school
was made upon the realization that he could not afford to attend his first
or second choice of schools.8 9
B. Subsection 4327(b)
Subsection (b) of the statute permits an action for support to be
instituted by either a parent or a child.' However, if the parent brings
an action on behalf of a child over eighteen years of age, the child's
written consent must be secured.9 1 States which have enacted similar
legislation appear to diverge on the issue of a child's standing to
commence an action for such support. On one hand, several state
statutes make no reference at all to the issue.' Alternatively, Colorado
law authorizes either the parent or the child to move for an order at any
time before the child attains the age of twenty-two.'o Similarly, Oregon
law recognizes that a child is a party for purposes of matters related to
an order of support for post-secondary educational expenses. 9'
C. Subsection 4327(c)
Subsection (c) requires a court to calculate educational costs in
accordance with the statutory definition.9 5 Subsection (j) defines
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(a).
87. 563 A.2d 102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
88. Id. at 107.
89. Id.
90. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(b).
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-12
(Bums 1987 & Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 19921993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West 1981 & Supp. 1993). In Illinois, the courts have
subsequently interpreted the state's statute and have held that a child lacks standing to compel a
parent to pay for post-secondary educational costs. See Miller v. Miller, 513 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987) (holding that a child cannot bring suit in his or her own name under the provisions
of chapter 40, paragraph 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act).
93. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(1.5)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (effective Sept. 1,
1993).
94. OR. REv. STAT. § 107.108 (1991).
95. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(c).
86.
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educational costs so as to include: tuition, fees, books, room and board,
and other educational materials. 96 The statute appears to define
educational costs more narrowly than prior case law had contemplated.
For example, in Lederer v. Lederer,7' the Superior Court remanded the
case for a further hearing to determine a father's ability to pay for his
daughter's college expenses other than tuition.' The court applauded
the father's willingness to pay for his daughter's tuition but stated that "it
does not take into account the other necessities involved in attending
college and in daily life. " 99 Thus, prior to enactment of title 23,
section 4327, a parent could arguably be ordered to contribute toward a
child's miscellaneous living expenses while the child attended college.
Subsequent case law confirms this interpretation of Lederer. In
Pharoah v. Lapes,'" the Superior Court upheld the order of a lower
court which obligated the father to pay for his son's post-secondary
educational expenses.11
These expenses included automobile
insurance, automobile maintenance, gasoline, and airfare." °
Such
expenses do not appear to fall within the purview of subsection (j) of title
23, section 4327."°3 Therefore, adult children and custodial parents,
in particular, may object to the narrow statutory definition of educational
costs, since an underlying goal of the statute is to afford children from
broken homes the same treatment as children from intact homes."
D. Subsection 4327(d)
Subsection (d) states that a court must deduct from the educational
costs all grants and scholarships awarded to the student. 15 This
provision clarifies varying positions found in prior case law. As early
as 1972, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that "[t]he

96. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 43270).
97. 435 A.2d 199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
98. Id. at 201.
99. Id.
100. 571 A.2d 1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
101. Id. at 1075.
102. Id. at 1074-75.
103. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 43270).
104. A recent Superior Court of Pennsylvania decision interpreting educational costs in a
voluntary agreement made part of a divorce proceeding bolsters such criticism. In Goss v. Timblin,
622 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), the court held that it was appropriate to include within the
calculation of college costs all additional expenses incurred by a former wife on the child's behalf
that she otherwise would not have paid if the child were working. Id. at 351. In short, the court
concluded that these costs, including food, utilities, medical insurance, and transportation, were
necessary adjunct expenses required in order for the student to complete the educational program
successfully. Id.
105. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(d).
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potential availability to students of loans, grants, or self-help by part-time
or summer employment does not negate the duty of the parent but does
merit cognizance thereof when a serious question of undue hardship is
presented."" ° In 1986, the court further stated that if a parent is able
to meet the support needs of a college-age child with ease, a court is free
to impose a complete obligation.'"
Most recently, in Blue, the
Superior Court held that no reduction in support may be ordered even if
the child receives financial aid."~ While the general assembly's intent
in drafting subsection (d) is difficult to ascertain, common sense suggests
that divorced, separated, or unmarried parents should not be denied the
benefit of their child's receipt of financial assistance, a benefit married

parents unquestionably enjoy.E. Subsection 4327(e)
Subsection (e) lists seven factors a court must consider if it orders
either or both parents to pay all or part of the remaining educational
costs of the child."
These factors include: the financial resources of
both parents;"' the financial resources of the child;"' receipt of
106. Commonwealth ex rel. Hanerkam v. Hanerkam, 289 A.2d 742, 744-45 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1972).
107. Miller v. Miller, 509 A.2d 402, 404 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
108. Blue, 616 A.2d at 630 (citing the Superior Court's memorandum decision in Blue v. Blue,
576 A.2d 1129 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).
109. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(e)(1)-(7) (Supp. 1994).
110. See generally Chesonis v. Chesonis, 538 A.2d 1376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (extent of noncustodial father's indebtedness precluded upholding of a support award); Leonard v. Leonard, 510
A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (father ordered to continue to support adopted daughter where
father's diminished earning capacity resulted from his agreement to a voluntary furlough); Monsky
v. Sacks, 588 A.2d 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (father who held master's degree but whose earnings
did not reflect level of education ordered to pay increased support for college-age son).
The holding of Sacks demonstrates the degree to which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
was willing, before the holding in Blue and enactment of title 23, section 4327, to order and enforce
support for post-secondary educational costs. In Sacks, the father was a teaching fellow and doctoral
candidate at Temple University, earning approximately twenty thousand dollars per year. Sacks, 588
A.2d at 21. He had no accumulated savings, drove a used car, rented an apartment, and owned only
several pieces of furniture and a computer. Id. The father had also incurred between ten and twenty
thousand dollars in outstanding debt, and was potentially liable for bills relating to past medical
treatment. Id. Nonetheless, the court held that financial resources are measured by earning
capacity, not actual income. Id. In this vein, the court recommended that the father secure
supplemental employment in order to meet his obligation. Id.
111. See generallyDevergilius v. Devergilius, 478 A.2d 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that
a college student's income, property, and trust fund were properly considered by the court); Sutliff
v. Sutliff, 528 A.2d 1318 (Pa. 1987) (Uniform Gift to Minors Act assets may be considered when
apportioning financial responsibility for a child's education). In Sutliff, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was presented the opportunity to challenge superior court precedent which recognized
the duty of a divorced or separated parent to support a child pursuing post-secondary education,
however, it failed to overturn the precedent. Admittedly, the issue was not squarely before the
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educational loans or other financial assistance;112 the ability,
willingness, and desire of the student to pursue and complete the course
of study;"' any willful estrangement between the parent and student
caused by the student after attaining majority; 14 the ability of the
student to contribute to the student's own expenses through gainful
employment; 5 and any other relevant factors." 6 Consideration of
each of these factors enables a court to examine both the pragmatic and
policy considerations underlying a support award, the approach
advocated by the court in Milne."7
The general assembly's inclusion of the child's ability, willingness,
and desire to pursue and complete a course of study as a factor, ensures
that a parent will not be compelled to support a child's educational
pursuit when the child is something less than an engaged participant.
Unlike many of the other factors listed under subsection (e), prior case
law provides specific guidance concerning the circumstances a court may
consider when assessing a child's ability, willingness, and desire to
pursue post-secondary education. For example, in Marino by Marino v.
Marino,"' the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's vacation of a
previous order of support requiring the mother to pay thirty-five percent
of a son's college tuition where the son had an abysmal academic
record." 9 Attendance at three separate colleges and an academic
record replete with failures, withdrawals, low grades, and academic
probation indicated the child's lack of commitment and seriousness to
complete his studies."
On the other hand, a child's poor performance during the first
semester or even the first year alone will not support a parent's assertion

court. Nonetheless, the court acquiesced to precedent and reiterated a limited parental duty if the
child shows a willingness and aptitude to undertake the studies and the parent can provide the
necessary funds without undue hardship. Id. at 1325.
112. See generally Bedford v. Bedford, 563 A.2d 102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Leonard v.
Leonard, 510 A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
113. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
115. Although case law prior to Blue generally supports inclusion of this factor, no case law
specifically enunciates that a child's ability to contribute to his or her own expenses is relevant in
fixing the amount of parental support. Furthermore, case law provides little guidance for
interpretation of the second sentence under subsection (e)(6), "The student's history of employment
is material under this paragraph." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(e)(6).
116. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(e)(7).
117. 556 A.2d 854 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
118. 601 A.2d 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
119. Id. at 1251.
120. Id. at 1245.
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that a child lacks the ability or willingness to complete his or her
studies. 2' Instead, a child's ability and willingness may be initially
established upon acceptance to and enrollment in a post-secondary
institution." Similarly, a court will probably not modify or terminate
a support award of post-secondary educational support if a child does not

maintain a minimum grade point average."
F. Subsection 4327(o

Subsection (f) demands that a court not order support for
educational costs if one of three circumstances exists."
A court
cannot order support for educational costs if undue financial hardship
results 25 or if such support represents a contribution toward graduate
education costs. 126 This latter provision is in accord with the Superior
Court's decision in Brown v. Brown, 7 where the court refused to
recognize a court's order of support for a first year law student.
Subsection (f)also specifies that no support order shall extend
beyond a child's twenty-third birthday."
The only way a support
order may extend beyond this age is by a showing of exceptional
circumstances.29
Exceptional circumstances may include health

121. See Commonwealth ex rel. Colligan v. Kass, 303 A.2d 225 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973). The
father's dissatisfaction with his daughter's academic performance was probably mere pretext for his
seeking termination of support under a voluntary agreement entered into with his former wife.
Instead, the father's concerns about his daughter's alleged sexual conduct likely motivated his
decision. As the trial court noted, "[ilt
is abhorrent to the conscience of this Court that the
defendant should be required to underwrite this young woman's abysmal academic charade so
infamously shrouded in immorality and lawlessness." Id. at 227. In reversing the trial court, the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania refused to entertain either the allegations of misconduct or the
complaints of poor academic performance. Id.
122. Kass, 303 A.2d at 227.
123. See generally Schmucker v. Hanna, 547 A.2d 379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that if
the parties intended in a voluntary separation agreement to demand a minimum grade point average
in exchange for support, they would have expressly stated so in the contract).
124. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(t)(I)-(3).
125. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(0(1).
126. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(0(2).
127. See Brown v. Brown, 474 A.2d 1168, 1169 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (the duty to provide
support for post-secondary education does not extend to graduate studies); but see Ross v. Ross, 400
A.2d 1233, 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (holding that an adult child was not emancipated
until completion of law school); Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1032 (N.J. 1982) (parental
responsibility includes a duty to assure children of college and even post-graduate education such
as law school).
128. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(0(3).
129. This may also ensure that the ultimate responsibility for career planning and decisionmaking remains with the child. For example, application of the subsection may prevent a child from
contemplating a career path or vocational training for a number of years without committing to any
particular goal and then claiming that indecision itself constitutes an exceptional circumstance so as
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problems, financial difficulties, or a death in the immediate family.130
This is a key provision because it ensures parents the finality of their
obligation under the statute.
G. Subsections 4327(g) & (h)
Subsections (g) and (h) further define the extent of a divorced,
separated, or unmarried parent's obligation for post-secondary
educational costs. 3 ' Subsection (g) excludes from a parent's obligation
any payments to the other parent for the child's living expenses unless
the child resides at home and commutes to school." 2 Subsection (h)
allows a party to request niodification or termination of a support order
upon proof of a change in the student's educational status or a material
change in a party's financial status .133 The latter subsection, when
viewed in conjunction with the age limitation found in subsection (f)(3),
may discourage courts from enforcing support in circumstances where
married parents would refuse to continue supporting their child.
VI. Critique of Pennsylvania's Recently Enacted Statute
A. Similarities and Differences between Title 23, Section 4327 and
Similar State Statutes
Each state statute which compels parents under certain circumstances
to support their adult children's pursuit of post-secondary education
manifests a similar legislative purpose."
However, important
distinctions may be drawn which reveal deficiencies in other states'
statutes and highlight the strengths of Pennsylvania's statute. For
example, Hawaii's statute imposes no age limitation upon receipt of
support for post-secondary educational expenses.' 35 As has been

to extend a support order beyond age twenty-three.
130. See McCabe v. Krupinski, 604 A.2d 732, 734 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that a
daughter's need for psychiatric care, the demands of a part-time job, her brother's death in 1985,
and her mother's nervous breakdown two years later represented exceptional circumstances
warranting extension of support beyond the age of twenty-three). The holding of Krupinski may
suggests that a finding of exceptional circumstances will be a difficult hurdle to overcome under the
new statute.
131. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(g), (h).
132. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(g).
133. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(h).
134. The legislative history of title 23, section 4327 articulates this purpose. In one senate
version of the bill, the preamble expressly stated that the commonwealth had a legitimate interest
in ensuring that children from broken homes are afforded the same educational opportunities as
children from intact homes. See Pa. S. 508, 1st. Sess., Print. No. 1347 (1993).
135. HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-47(a)(4) (Supp. 1992). However, revisions to an existing support
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stated, a similar support order in Pennsylvania remains effective only to
age twenty-three, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances.' 36
In Colorado, post-secondary educational support encompasses
tuition, supplies, room and board, health insurance, extraordinary
medical expenses, and transportation expenses." 7 However, an award
for such support is limited to the annual amount paid by the noncustodial parent under the most recent child support order. 3 ' By
contrast, title 23, section 4327 permits an award of support for
educational expenses regardless of any amount paid under the most
recent support order.
Admittedly, a support award made pursuant to title 23, section 4327
may not include payments for health insurance,' 39 medical expenses,
or travel expenses. Nonetheless, courts in Pennsylvania do not face the
arbitrary limitation imposed upon the Colorado judiciary by its state
statute when determining the propriety of a support order for postsecondary educational costs. Outlays for tuition, room, and board may
result in a substantial increase in a custodial parent's and a child's
expenses. Therefore, limiting a support award for post-secondary
educational costs to an amount equal to a previous support award runs
counter to financial reality.
The statutes of Illinois, Indiana, and New Jersey appear to resemble
Pennsylvania's in form and content. Both the Indiana and Illinois
statutory provisions, for example, delineate factors a court must consider
in making an award of post-secondary educational support. These factors
include the financial resources of both the parents and the child, the
child's educational needs, and the standard of living the child would have
enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved.Y Nevertheless, case law

order, as in Pennsylvania, may be made upon demonstration of a change in circumstances of the
parent or the child. HAW. REv. STAT. § 580-47(c) (Supp. 1992).
136. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
137. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(1.5)(b)(ll)(e) (WestSupp. 1993) (effective Sept. 1,
1993).
138. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(1.5)(b)(I) (West Supp. 1993) (effective Sept. 1,
1993).
139. A non-custodial parent in Pennsylvania may be required to furnish health insurance
coverage for a college-age child, despite the limitations of title 23, section 4327. Another state
statute requires the court, in every proceeding that establishes or modifies a child support order, to
ascertain the ability of each parent to provide health care coverage for a child. See 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 4326(a) (Supp. 1993). Whether or not a proceeding to determine a support obligation
under title 23, section 4327 falls within the purview of title 23, section 4326 remains unclear and
may be resolved in future litigation.
140. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1992-1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-11.5-12(a)(l)-(4) (Bums 1987 & Supp. 1993).
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in Illinois has exposed weaknesses in the Illinois statute that may not
plague the Pennsylvania statute.
One weakness is the limited number of factors that an Illinois court
must consider before entering an order for post-secondary educational
support. In In re Marriage of Sreenan,'4 ' an appellate court expressly
held that a divorced or separated parent's obligation to provide support
for college expenses is not conditioned upon a continued good
relationship between a parent and child or upon obtaining prior consent
from the supporting parent. 42 Title 23, section 4327 may prevent a
similar outcome in Pennsylvania, because a court must first assess, to
some degree, the relationship that exists between the parent and child
before granting a support award. 43
The New Jersey statute exhibits a limitation similar to its
counterparts in Illinois and Indiana. The statute lists many more factors
than the Illinois and Indiana statutes,'" however, these factors, unlike
those delineated under the Pennsylvania statute, focus predominantly
upon the financial status of the parents.
Oregon's and Iowa's statutes are the least explicit among those states
where a statutory duty is imposed upon parents to pay for post-secondary
educational expenses. Under Oregon law, an order may be entered
against either or both parents to provide for the support and maintenance
of a child attending school. 45 The statute defines a child attending
school as an unmarried child between eighteen and twenty-one years of
age who attends high school, a community college, a college or
university, or a vocational or technical training center designed to fit the
child for gainful employment.' 46 The Iowa statute simply authorizes
court-ordered support for adult children between the ages of eighteen and

141. 402 N.E.2d 348 (111.App. Ct. 1980).
142. Id. at 352.
143. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(e)(5).
144. The New Jersey legislature drafted these factors and added them to section 2A: 34:23 in
1988. They include: (1) the needs of the child; (2) standard of living and economic circumstances
of each parent; (3) all sources of income and assets of each parent; (4) earning ability of each parent,
including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, custodial
responsibility for children including the cost of providing child care and the length of time and cost
to each parent to obtain training and experience for appropriate employment; (5) need and capacity
of the child for education, including higher education; (6) age and health of the child and each
parent: (7) income, assets, and earning ability of the child; (8) responsibility of the parents for courtordered support of others; (9) reasonable debts and liabilities of each parent and child; and (10) any
other factors the court may deem relevant. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34:23(a) (Supp. 1993-1994).
145.
146.

OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108(1) (1991).
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108(4) (1991).
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twenty-two who regularly attend an accredited school, college, or a
vocational training center on a full-time basis. 147
The dearth of legislative guidance in both the Oregon and Iowa
statutes is clearly juxtaposed to the guidance contained in Pennsylvania's
post-secondary educational support statute. Title 23, section 4327
enumerates the conditions under which a court may award support for
post-secondary educational expenses, defines these costs, and lists
numerous factors a court must consider before ordering a parent to pay
such costs.148
Moreover, the statute permits termination or
modification of an order upon proof of a change in the educational status
49
of the child or a material change in the financial status of any party.1
Theoretically, a more clear delineation of the rights and responsibilities
of both parent and child may help to curtail litigation over certain issues,
thereby reducing the judiciary's involvement in what should remain
predominantly a private, family decision.
B. Title 23, Section 4327's Effectiveness in Balancing Competing
Policy Objectives
Title 23, section 4327 is not without its shortcomings even though
it comprehensively addresses the issue of parental support for a child's
post-secondary educational costs. Undoubtedly, title 23, section 4327
reestablishes in Pennsylvania a divorced, separated, or unmarried
parent's duty to support a child's pursuit of post-secondary education
under certain circumstances. However, the statute qualifies and, in
effect, truncates the meaning of support as defined by case law in the
Commonwealth prior to Blue.
The rather narrow definition of
educational costs, for example, may limit an adult child's, and more
significantly, a custodial parent's ability to secure support for the
numerous expenses that may not qualify as "educational materials" but
are nonetheless necessary to complete a course of study. For example,
clothing, household items, medical expenses, transportation, and
automobile insurance are unlikely to qualify as "educational materials"
under title 23, section 4327.
Moreover, consideration has not been given to the increased
expenses custodial parents incur if a child resides with that parent during
summer vacations or breaks." 5 Case law prior to the Blue decision

147. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993).
148. See supra notes 77-117 and accompanying text.
149. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(h).
150. Notwithstanding the limitations inherent in the Colorado statute discussed above, it
nevertheless does confront this issue by authorizing payments from one parent to another when the
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The general assembly's
upheld the payment of such expenses."'
apparent exclusion of these expenses from the scope of the statute will
increase the financial burden on custodial parents for a certain portion of
a child's expenses, thereby frustrating the equitable principles underlying
the statute.
Furthermore, section 4327 does not indicate whether a deceased
parent's estate may remain obligated for a support order entered pursuant
to the statute. Although support for a minor child in Pennsylvania
generally ends upon a parent's death, 52 the absence of language in the
53
statute defining this issue may nonetheless generate future litigation.
In addition, title 23, section 4327 lacks an enforcement provision for
support orders entered pursuant to the statute. The statute's silence on
the issue of enforcement may be questioned, considering both the
substantial number of non-custodial parents who default on court-ordered
and the pressure placed upon
support for minor children"
governments to solve this problem.155

child resides with one parent during periods of time in excess of thirty days when school is not in
session. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(1.5)(b)(I) (West Supp. 1993) (effective Sept. 1,
1993).
151. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
152. See In re Fesman's Estate, 126 A.2d 676, 678 (Pa. 1956) (holding that a father, in the
absence of a contract, has no legal obligation to support his children after his death).
153. The absence of such language in ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 40, para. 513, Illinois' postmajority educational support statute, has already generated litigation in that state. The courts have
held that a former spouse can assert a claim against an ex-spouse's estate for college expenses
payable under an order entered pursuant to chapter 40, paragraph 513 where the parties did not
agree that the obligation would terminate on the death of the former spouse. See In re Estate of
Champagne v. DeFrancesca, 505 N.E.2d 1352 (111. App. Ct. 1987). The court opined that, because
chapter 40, paragraph 510, Illinois' support statute for minor children, allows a claim against the
deceased parent's estate, a similar claim exists by implication under chapter 40, paragraph 513. Id.
at 1354-55.
154. A recent article cites a 1989 U.S. Bureau of the Census finding that only twenty-six percent
of parents who were entitled to receive court-ordered support actually received the entire amount due
them. See Rore Sherman, IRS to Collect From Dad?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13, 1993, at 1.
155. The pressure has prompted action at both the federal and state level. The federal
government has introduced amendments to its child support enforcement program created under Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act that would mandate that all states adopt the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
The amendments aim to eliminate on-going difficulties in interstate child support
enforcement. See McMillion, supra note 11, at 107. Furthermore, experts note that, if the effort
to create uniform state laws fails to remedy the problems plaguing child support enforcement, further
federal involvement may be forthcoming. See Sherman, supra note 154, at 35.
The threat of further federal involvement in child support enforcement has prompted state
action as well. In Pennsylvania, for example, the general assembly, contemporaneous with
enactment of title 23, section 4327, passed legislation which permits county domestic relations
offices to publish in local newspapers the names of delinquent support obligors who are in arrears
thirty days or more. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4309 (Supp. 1994). It is unclear, though,
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Title 23, section 4327 does state that its provisions cannot supersede
or modify the express terms of a voluntary written marital agreement or
any court order entered pursuant thereto. 56 From a public policy
perspective, this provision may encourage parents to avoid litigation,
thereby shielding a private, family decision from the eyes of the court.
Nonetheless, the general assembly may have afforded parents an
opportunity to dangle post-secondary educational costs as a bargaining
tool in settlement negotiation. In any case, the provision probably will
not enable parents to enter into a settlement agreement which furnishes
a child substantially less than that which is conferred by the statute.
Most importantly, the statute fails to encourage either parent-parent
or parent-child dialogue with regard to a child's educational interests,
goals, and choice of institution. In essence, a divorced, separated, or
unmarried parent, especially one who is financially capable of supporting
a child's post-secondary educational pursuits, may be denied any input
regarding the school the child attends or the conditions under which
support continues. In this sense, the statute may grant children of
divorced, separated, or unmarried parents more than those children
whose parents remained married."
Clearly, evidence of a child's
willingness to involve a parent in the decision-making process deserves
express recognition under the statute as a factor Pennsylvania courts must
consider before awarding support for post-secondary educational
expenses.
VII. Conclusion
The parental obligation, following the dissolution of marriage, to
support a child's pursuit of post-secondary education has engendered

whether this section applies to support orders entered pursuant to title 23, section 4327.
156.
157.

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327()(2). "
Litigation subsequent to enactment of title 23, section 4327 has focused on this very issue.

In fact, several parents have challenged the statute's constitutionality on equal protection grounds.
Opinions in the courts of common pleas have diverged on this particular issue, and the
constitutionality of title 23, section 4327 remains unclear as of publication. See Curtis v. Kline, 42
Ches. Co. Rep. 147 (1994) (on appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania) (holding that the

legislature has no rational basis for treating students and/or parents differently based upon parental
status); Fender v. Fender, 56 Pitt. Legal J. 304 (1994) (on appeal to the Superior Court of

Pennsylvania) (holding that § 4327 meets the standard of rational-basis review, since children of
non-intact parents will have greater difficulty obtaining educational support than those of an intact
family); Brynes v. Caldwell, _
Mont. Co. L. Rep. _
(1994) (holding that § 4327 is rationally

related to the state's interest in minimizing the negative consequences that divorce and separation
may have on a child's opportunities for higher education): Hasson v. Hasson. Vol. 27 Lawr. Co. L. J.
297 (1994) (holding that, under a rational basis standard of analysis, § 4327 does not violate the
equal protection provisions of the U.S. or Pennsylvania Constitutions because it does not promote

invidious discrimination).
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considerable debate and discussion for over two decades. Adoption of
the Twenty-sixth Amendment triggered the debate, and subsequent
increases in the divorce rate, in post-secondary enrollment, and in postsecondary educational costs have sustained the debate to the present day.
In light of these social and economic developments, one might surmise
that a parent's obligation of support for post-secondary educational costs
has gained greater acceptance among state legislatures and the judiciary.
However, most states continue to adhere to the general rule that a
parent's duty of support ends upon a child's reaching the age of majority.
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania has assumed a leadership role and has
joined a small number of states which, by statute, authorize their courts
to order support for post-secondary educational expenses. The enactment
of title 23, section 4327 in Pennsylvania should be viewed as a step
forward in ensuring that children from broken families are afforded the
same educational opportunities as children from intact families.
Certainly, the state has a real interest in accomplishing this goal."S
Moreover, Pennsylvania's statute strikes a balance between the
legitimate interests of a child in pursuing higher education and the
interests of parents in foreseeing a definitive end to support
obligations.159 The strength of the statute generally lies in its thorough
articulation of the circumstances under which courts may order parents
to pay for post-secondary educational costs. While the definition of
educational costs under the statute may be narrowly circumscribed, and
inadequate consideration given to the importance of parental involvement
in a child's educational and decision-making process, title 23, section
4327 may nonetheless serve as a useful model for states drafting new
legislation or contemplating amendments to existing law.
Jeffrey A. Muriceak

158. The facts of O'Connell v. O'Connell, 597 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) may indeed
provide proof that title 23, section 4327 is based upon sound public policy. In O'Connell, the court
affirmed a trial court order of support imposed upon a father, an attorney, for seventy percent of
his daughter's college expenses. Id. at 648. In affirming the support order, the court noted that the
record was replete with evidence demonstrating the father's lack of compassion and.total disdain for
his daughter and minor son. Id. at 645. Moreover, the court found reprehensible the father's
repeated references to his children as "disinherited mistakes." Id.
159. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in Dewalt v. DeWalt, 529 A.2d 508 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987), described these competing interests in its decision in colorful language:
A child of college years should not be destroyed by slavish labor because his parents have
chosen to divorce. On the other hand, a parent should not be required to devote every
waking moment to the pursuit of monetary gain so a child may spend [a] summer
employed only in the pursuit of a perfect tan.
Id. at 512.

